

# USING THE COMMON CRITERIA IN PRACTICE

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# Disclaimers

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- Personal views of authors
- Not necessarily official view of UK Ministry of Defence
- Experiences of a major user of evaluated products, not a product vendor
- Part of our experience relates to ITSEC, not CC
- We only distinguish ITSEC from CC where it mattered to us

# LITS

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- Logistics Information Technology System (LITS)
- Royal Air Force (RAF) Aircraft Engineering and Supply Functions
  - *also (at times) office automation and communications*
- Largest operational IT system in UK forces
  - *By an order of magnitude*

# Development history

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- Development started 1990
- Initial operational capability 1996
- Development completed 2000
  - *Development completed on time, under budget*
- Final activity was Security Accreditation on 4th January 2001
  - *Based on CESG System Certification S112 dated 30th November 2000*

# Real world

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- In the real world, development work did not stop in 2000
- Reaccredited following major enhancements/changes
  - *7 May 2003*
  - *2 July 2007*
  - *15 April 2008*
  - *1 June 2009*
- Future will depend on UK Government's current Strategic Defence and Security Review

# Original vision

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- Integrated air logistics approach paid for by efficiency savings
- 15,000 to 20,000 dedicated terminals worldwide with up to 25,000 users
- 24/7 service to users
- Better quality data, delivered more quickly

# Today's system

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- Air Logistics Data Centre (ALDC)
- Integrated services
- 300 dedicated workstations; 6,000 direct users; multiple data feeds and sources
- Flexible real-time delivery of real-time data
- Major component of tri-service defence equipment and supply capability

# User architecture

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- Example: Asset Life Update
- AM Application component AT3610C
  - *Functionality accepted 1995*
  - *Functionality unchanged today*
- Implementations have changed, logic has not



# System architecture

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## ■ Key concepts in 1990:

- *Distributed data and processing across 70+ locations*
- *Consistency based on OSI standards*
- *Networked communications based on X.25 packet switching*
- *Client/server with server nodes on the majority of RAF sites*
- *Intelligent terminals implementing secure protocols*

## ■ Key concepts in 2010:

- *Centralised data store*
- *Commercial product driven*
- *TCP/IP*
- *Centralised web servers and data feeds*
- *Access by secure browser session from any suitable MOD PC*

# Architectures in practice

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## ■ In the Real World, architectures change

- *First delivered architecture: dumb UNIX clients to local/remote UNIX servers*
- *Replaced by: Windows clients to local Windows servers to local/remote UNIX database servers*
- *Replaced by: Windows Citrix clients to local Windows Citrix/application servers to local/remote UNIX database servers*
- *Replaced by: Windows GUI Application to local Windows Citrix/application servers to local/remote UNIX database servers*
- *Replaced by: Vanilla Browser to remote Web Servers to application servers to virtualised database servers*
- *Augmented by: Data feed to XML proxy to application servers to virtualised database servers*

# LESSON ONE

Evaluation Strategies Matter

# Original concept

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- RAF originally contracted for a certified system
- Obtaining certification was the Prime System Integrator (PSI)'s problem
- First live deployment in 1996 was excused formal evaluation
  - *Experimental*
  - *Small user community*
  - *Low-risk functionality*
  - *Limited lifetime*
- Evaluation work by CLEF did proceed in parallel but was always playing catch-up
- PSI's problem became our problem

# API Review

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- November 1997: Three initial system releases had shown that our agreed development strategy was ineffective
  - *Evaluation lag was a minor problem compared to other issues*
- UNIX was a dead-end for client platforms (primarily training costs, also stability issues)
- The users could never specify what they wanted until they had something that was not quite right
- Decision to change platform and delivery strategy
  - *NT*
  - *No "big bang" deliveries, incremental packaging instead*
- Evaluation had to fit in with this new approach

# Evaluation strategy

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- Evaluation strategy had always been flexible
  - *Had accommodated a change of DBMS without major upset*
- But suddenly a lot of completed evaluation documentation became irrelevant
  - *And a small proportion became very important in demonstrating that the new architecture could be secure*
- Some of the security functionality was built into applications
  - *Actually, application libraries*
  - *Stable, unchanged, already working*
- Other security functional requirements were unchanged but would be implemented by different COTS products

# Pace of change

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- During the late 1990s there were new system releases every three months
- Under the UK ITSEC scheme, our system evaluation required a stable platform for at least 4 months to reach a certifiable state
- It did not seem sensible to certify a system release that had already been replaced in live operation
- However, some ITSEC evaluation activities did give useful results to the developers and assurance to management
  - *These activities were generally documentation-light*

# Approval to operate

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- CESG cautiously willing to accept product evaluation results in a system context without a system evaluation
- MOD cautiously willing to accept our application-level security as proven in practice
- Not enough confidence for formal approval
- Agreed decision to defer system evaluation until “development complete”
  - *Approval to operate based on alternative assurances*
  - *Risk based arguments*
  - *Supported by independent vulnerability testing*



# System evaluation

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- System evaluation (against ITSEC) performed in 2000
- All key LITS security products were already evaluated
  - *CC was coming into use, but all infrastructure products used by LITS at that time were certified against ITSEC*
- System evaluation assumed relevant evaluated products security functionality was implemented correctly
  - *Security Target coverage was almost but not quite complete*
- System was kept stable whilst evaluation work completed, written up and certified

# Evaluation results

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- Evaluation results were certifiable by CESG
- ITSEC Certificate issued
- System formally accredited in January 2001
- Very minor conditions and reservations
- Certification conditions were violated immediately
  - *NT clients and servers patched!*
- Recognition within LITS that the six month pause in development work in 2000 could never be repeated

# New evaluation strategy

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- Application level security functionality would have to be re-evaluated if changed
  - *But evaluation not required if re-implemented and shown by testing to be functionally equivalent*
- Product security functionality would not have to be re-evaluated in three cases:
  - *Security functionality expressly covered by a valid product certification*
  - *Manufacturer patches to certified products*
  - *Approved later releases of certified products undergoing evaluation*

# Impact of new philosophy

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- Application level functionality has never been a problem
  - *If it's a pure reimplementation, it must produce identical results to before*
  - *For all test suites, including the evaluation suite*
- Patching certified products
  - *Frequency and urgency of patching escalated after 2000*
  - *Responsible for some of security's most pressing and difficult practical problems*
  - *Patching is more stable today than a few years ago*
  - *But always our most unsatisfactory evaluation risk*

# Later versions of products

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- Important concession initially
  - *Re-evaluation often slow, and different labs/targets often made it difficult to compare evaluation results*
- Over time, the commitment by vendors to evaluation of new versions has become standard and customary
- Leading to inherent confidence that new versions will pass evaluation
- Under CC, compliance with standard Protection Profiles usually trivialises our reassessment
  - *Major efficiency saving*
  - *We know which bits of CAPP we rely upon!*

# New products

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- Prior to 2000, key infrastructure products often lacked essential security functionality
  - *Let alone certified security functionality*
- Add-on security packages introduced their own integration vulnerabilities
- In 2000, lack of alternative certified products was a major disincentive to changing infrastructure architectures
  - *ITSEC certified products were rarely directly comparable*

# Common Criteria

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- The first time a new infrastructure product was shown from its Security Target to have all the security functionality we needed was 2004 (and from a CC target)
- By 2006, we expected to find the information in the CC Target
  - *And for the Target to be available*
- We now expect all infrastructure products with security functionality to be CC certified by the time LITS has completed a related development project
  - *Although, our development cycle is longer than in 2000, because of the inertia inherent from our user estate*

# LESSON TWO

## Evaluation Costs



# Costs

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- The cost of security evaluation was included in LITS costs from the start
- We spent money on early evaluation activities that was nugatory
  - *Of course, we didn't know in advance which bits would be vital in enabling us to change architectures and which would be irrelevant*
- The actual cost to first certification was substantially lower than expected
  - *The growth in certified COTS products was not anticipated*
  - *We over-estimated our dependence on secure applications*

# Operational security costs

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- Maintaining an accredited system costs money
  - *Including avoiding further security evaluations*
- Initially, choosing certified products limited our product choice
  - *Now rarely true, we find our preferred infrastructure products are either security certified or are not security relevant*
- Still some compromises
  - *Example: limiting remote management*
- Certification maintenance costs are not popular
  - *Fixing flaws that are found is even less so*
- Maintaining application security has always been a minimal cost, and a non-issue

# LESSON THREE

Evaluation cannot prove anything

# Evaluation as a tool

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- Product certification has no credibility with our infrastructure architects
  - *If it meant anything, why so many patches?*
- Architectural arguments convince
  - *No data flow, no data compromise*
- So does independent testing
  - *Whether as part of an evaluation or otherwise*

# LESSON FOUR

## Evaluation and Government Policy

# UK Security Evaluation Policy

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- UK Government Policy on security evaluation has been through multiple upheavals
- During LITS development, system evaluation was mandatory
- Now, system evaluation and use of evaluated products is only a recommendation
  - *Risk assessment and risk management are mandatory*
  - *Evaluation recommended to help counter some risks*
- LITS is likely to avoid security products not submitted for evaluation on risk grounds
  - *Product evaluation is customary, why would a vendor not do it?*

# Evaluation Assurance Levels

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- At one time UK Government policy specified an algorithm to calculate minimum CC EALs for products implementing security barriers
  - *The results of the relevant algorithm were achievable and intuitively reasonable when applied to LITS*
  - *The algorithm could be subverted*
- Under current policy, recommended EALs are architecture independent
  - *Difficult for our infrastructure architects to accept*
  - *Difficult for our financiers to ignore*

# Conclusions

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- Evaluation and certification has always been an important part of our security strategy
- System evaluation was unrealistic
- Certified products give us assurance at little cost (to us)
- Product certification using CC has enabled us to change infrastructure components without changing our security requirements
- Our developers understand the need for a secure system but see little benefit from evaluation
- The ITSEC/CC evaluation and certification model was, and remains, unrealistic



# Questions?

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